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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, national newspapers all over the world have suggested that we should reread 
John Maynard Keynes, and that Hyman P. Minsky provides a valuable framework for 
understanding the world in which we live. While rereading Keynes and discovering 
Minsky are noble goals, one should also remember the mistakes that were made in the 
past. The mainstream interpretation and implementation of Keynes’s ideas have been 
very different from what Keynes proposed, and they have been reduced to simple “fiscal 
activism.” This led to the 1950s and 1960s “Keynesian” era, during which fine-tuning 
was supposed to be a straightforward way to fix economic problems. We know today that 
this is not the case: just playing around with taxes and government expenditures will not 
do. On the contrary, problems may worsen. If one wants to get serious about Keynes and 
Minsky, one should understand that the theoretical and policy implications are far-
reaching. This paper compares and contrasts Minsky’s views of the capitalist system to 
the tenets of the New Consensus, and argues that there never has been any true Keynesian 
revolution. This is illustrated by studying the Roosevelt and Kennedy/Johnson eras, as 
well as Keynes’s reaction to the former and Minsky’s critique of the latter. Overall, it is 
argued that the theoretical framework and policy prescriptions of Irving Fisher, not 
Keynes, have been much more consistent with past and current government policies. 
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Minsky’s analysis led him to conclude that there are different forms of capitalism each 
with pros and cons. Laissez-faire capitalism, where the government represents an 
insignificant proportion of the economy, promotes individual initiatives and creativity 
(what one may call entrepreneurship) but also generates depressions, and unfair 
inequalities. On the contrary, big-government capitalism is more stable but also comes 
with its own problems like a lack of dynamism and inflationary tendencies. Following 
Keynes, Minsky stated that unfair distribution, economic instability and unemployment 
were structural problems of market mechanisms, and so he promoted a form of capitalism 
that significantly involves the government. 
Many current economists would associate Minsky’s view with the Neoclassical 
Synthesis of the 1950s and 1960s, a.k.a. “Keynesianism,” when monetary and fiscal 
discretions were used to fine-tune the economy. In this case, most economists would 
brush away Minsky’s proposal for the same reasons they rejected Keynesianism in the 
1970s: lack of rationality (Lucas’s critique), ignorance of credibility and reputation, and 
lack of consideration for lags and structural barriers to low unemployment.  
However, Minsky was careful to note that there are different forms of big-
government capitalisms and that not all forms of government activism are consistent with 
Keynes’s policy agenda. The Bastard Keynesianism of the mid-20
th century, to take Joan 
Robinson’s colorful characterization, tends to generate inequalities, inflationary pressures 
and long-term unemployment by creating strong income disincentives to reenter the labor 
force and to hire, by not dealing properly with the chronic shortage of jobs and focusing 
mainly on retraining and fine-tuning, by limiting collective bargaining processes, and by 
limiting government involvement to unproductive activities. This form of big government 
capitalism also tends to promote moral hazard in the financial sector by putting most of 
the emphasis on sustaining investment while having a limited reactive regulatory and 
supervisory framework. On the contrary, Minsky put forward a form of big government 
that limits political discretion in daily socio-economic decisions, and that limits 
inflationary pressures as well as promotes work habits and individual initiatives.   4
The first part of the paper broadly reviews Minsky’s theoretical framework and 
compares it to the New Consensus in order to understand his position regarding the role 
of the government. The second part of the paper presents some of the pros and cons of 
big-government capitalism and presents some of the solutions proposed by Minsky to 
deal with potential problems. The last part of the paper studies the “Keynesian” agenda of 
the Roosevelt and Kennedy/Johnson eras. Overall, the paper concludes that a big-
government is needed but that it should not take the form of a fine tuner, nor of massive 
state control, but of a planner that complements, and interacts with, the private sector. 
 
MINSKY AND MAINSTREAM: TWO VIEWS OF CAPITALISM 
 
Real Exchange Economy vs. Monetary Production Economy 
Today most economists assume that the study of barter provides a good proxy to 
understand all economic systems (tribal, command, and capitalist systems). In a barter 
theoretical system, economic agents have a given amount of resources and market 
exchange allows them to better their positions by obtaining the goods desired. Money 
may be added to the story but it does not change substantially, or at all, the conclusions 
drawn from pure barter. Money is just a means to smooth exchange and is not sought for 
itself; individuals care only about the material gains and losses from exchange before 
making a decision so that “prior to the introduction of informational asymmetries, […] 
financial structure is irrelevant” (Gertler 1988: 581). Once those gains and losses have 
been determined in a set of complete markets, all exchanges are executed instantaneously 
for all present and future contingencies, and nothing changes unless “shocks” affect the 
system. The future is known with certainty at least in the sense that all contingencies have 
been priced correctly and included in decisions. Moreover, if, as the result of a shock, 
someone decides to reverse a decision, this can be done easily and immediately. 
Keynes called the previous system a real-exchange economy and argued that it 
does not apply to capitalism. Capitalism is a monetary-production economy. 
Commodities need to be produced before they can be exchanged, and production is 
undertaken with the expectations of selling output, needs to be financed, takes time to be 
implemented and completed, gathers groups with different economic interests, and   5
involves irreversible decisions. All this is done in the context of a competitive 
environment that emulates monetary accumulation and imposes monetary return targets. 
Thus, capitalism has two salient features, it pushes individuals to anticipate an uncertain 
future in order to get an edge against competitors, and financial considerations are at the 
heart of the system. Consequently, “money plays a part of its own and affects motives 
and decisions” (Keynes 1933a [1973]: 408) and so influences the allocation, production 
and distribution processes (Veblen 1901: 214-215). Another consequence is that the 
system is highly dynamic and forever changing; stability is inconsistent with the principle 
of edging others through constant innovations. 
All this is in sharp contrast with the barter system; money is not a patch that can 
be added at will to the theoretical framework, it must be at the heart of a theoretical 
framework that aims at understanding capitalism. In a capitalist economy, people focus 
on their liquidity and solvency and those financial concerns are inclusive of purchasing 
power concerns. Thus, more than the purchasing power of money, people care about the 
financial power of money, i.e. the capacity to meet financial commitments when they 
come due. The central importance of those financial attributes, however, is not based on 
the existence of asymmetries of information but on the nature of capitalist economies. 
Unfortunately, those financial aspects, which are at the core of Keynes’s analysis, were 
pushed aside and made irrelevant by Bastard Keynesianism (Patinkin 1956; Modigliani 
and Miller 1958); “Keynesianism” was back to a Pigouvian world and the insights of 
Keynes and the late Fisher were ultimately lost.  
 
Intrinsic Stability vs. Intrinsic Instability 
In a real-exchange economy, under perfect competition, market forces help to stabilize 
economic activity, they do not generate economic instability by themselves. The latter is 
a rare event that is generated by external factors like government intervention and 
random shocks. Government intervention is thought to be intrinsically unstable for two 
reasons (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Friedman 1968; Kydland and Prescott 1977; 
Barro and Gordon 1983). A first reason is the assumed incompetence of policymakers to 
deal with economic problems, as well as the lags involved in policymaking, which lead to 
economic mismanagement, instability, and suboptimal economic results. A second reason   6
is political interests, which, even if policymakers are well-intentioned, lead to time 
inconsistency.  
Minsky’s research led him to conclude that capitalism is a highly dynamic system 
permeated by dialectical forces and circularities (feedback loops) specific to this system. 
He argued that “stability is destabilizing,” i.e. prolonged economic growth generates 
financial fragility, and that relevant business cycles are mainly “due to financial attributes 
that are essential to capitalism” (Minsky 1986: 173). He noted that periods of financial 
instability are not rare events, but that since World War II their effects have been 
contained by massive government interventions (albeit with large side effects). He and 
others criticized Monetarists for being too restrictive in their definition of financial crises 
by reducing them to bank panics (Schwartz 1988, 1998), and for brushing aside events 
that would have been catastrophic (potentially of the same magnitude as the Great 
Depression) if the government had not intervened (Sinai 1976; Minsky 1986; Mishkin 
1991).  
The dialectical nature of capitalism means that both market forces and the 
government, as well as their interactions, may promote stability and instability. In terms 
of market forces, Minsky emphasized, among others, the dialectical nature of competition, 
innovations, and banks. Competition promotes economic growth and entrepreneurship, 
but it also promotes short-termism and conformism, even though this may entail a great 
deal of risks. Innovations create new markets but also alter the structure of the economy, 
behaviors, and incentives. Banks, at least in the “commitment” (or “partnership”) banking 
model, promote stability by carefully selecting borrowers, but banks also promote 
instability because of the structure of their balance sheet and because of competitive 
pressures to meet targeted returns. In terms of government intervention, Minsky noted 
that a big government, through its buffer programs and regulations, promotes economic 
stability but also tends to generate inflationary pressures and to promote moral hazard. In 
addition, competition pushes the private sector to try to evade, through innovations, the 
barriers put on profit accumulation by regulation. Thus, if the government is too slow to 
respond to changes in the economy, its regulations may become obsolete and may 
promote instability.    7
This dialectical aspect of capitalism has been observed by many economists, 
practitioners and casual observers: 
In the 1960s, commercial bank clients frequently inquired how far they could 
prudently go in breaching traditional standards of liquidity and capitalization that 
were clearly obsolescent. My advice was always the same—to stick with the 
majority. Anyone out front risked drawing the lightning of the Federal Reserve or 
other regulatory retribution. Anyone who lagged behind would lose their market 
share. But those in the middle had safety in numbers; they could not all be 
punished, for fear of the repercussion of the economy as a whole. […] And if the 
problem grew too big for the Federal Reserve and the banking system were 
swamped, well then the world would be at an end anyhow and even the most 
cautious of banks would likely be dragged down with the rest. (Wojnilower 1977: 
235-236) 
Regarding the financial troubles involving the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), Schinasi noted that: 
Although it is easy in retrospect to question why LTCM’s counterparties did not demand 
more information, in a competitive environment, cost considerations must have weighed 
heavily. Clearly, LTCM’s counterparties thought the cost of more information was too 
high, and walking away from deals was not seen as in their interest. (Schinasi 2006: 221) 
However, even if the cost of information is low, it may not be in the interests of 
individuals to check the information: 
Above all, it is evident that the capacity of the financial community for ignoring evidence 
of accumulating trouble, even of wishing devoutly that it might go unmentioned, is as 
great as ever. (Galbraith 1961: xxi) 
Recently, in the mortgage industry, lenders did not bother to verify the stated income of 
borrowers with the I.R.S. even though they had the means to do so quickly and at very 
low cost (Morgenson 2008). Overall, therefore, Minsky noted that there is nothing 
magical about market forces, and the same applies to government intervention; however, 
the government can help to stabilize the system. 
Aside of proper regulation and supervision, stabilization comes through the cash-
flow and balance-sheet impacts of governmental activities (including the central bank). In 
terms of cash flows, government expenditures and transfers provide some income to the   8
private sector. In terms of balance sheet, a sovereign government injects default-free 
liquid assets in the private sector. Government deficits also indirectly help to sustain asset 
prices because the latter depend on the discounted value of expected future profits (which 
partly depend on current profits). Finally, the government also directly helps to sustain 
asset prices by acting as a lender of last resort whenever necessary. The Keynesian 
multiplier is a common way to present the direct and indirect income impacts, but 
Kalecki’s equation of profit is maybe more insightful to show the direct impact of 
government spending and taxing on the private sector. The macroeconomic monetary 
gross profit of firms is equal to (Kalecki 1971): 
Π = I – SW + DEF + NX 
With Π the gross profit after taxes, SW the saving of wage earners, I the gross private 
domestic investment, DEF the government fiscal deficit, and NX net exports. Thus, 
through its fiscal policy, the government sector helps to contain the destabilizing effect of 
the positive feedback loop that is present in the previous equation. Indeed, the gross profit 
of the business sector is sustained by its investment expenditure, which in turn depends 
on the profit expectation of entrepreneurs. This “peculiar circularity of a capitalist 
economy” (Minsky 1986: 227) is part of the internal flaw of capitalism; however, 
entrepreneurs have usually no knowledge of this process, or do not take it into account, 
which has important implications for the dynamics of the Minskyan system (Tymoigne 
2008).  
 
Government: Temporary and Limited vs. Permanent and Broad 
Because Minsky and the New Consensus have a diametrically opposed view of 
capitalism, it is not surprising that their view of the role of the government differs greatly. 
In the New Consensus, it is only if there are market imperfections, like price rigidities or 
asymmetric information, that the government has a role to play. The government should 
apply temporary, quick and targeted policies in order to compensate for those 
imperfections and to put the economy back on its “natural” path. Policy intervention, thus, 
may be good as long as the government does not try to push the economy above its 
natural path and the response is quick. The latter conditions are usually not verified; 
therefore, having policy institutions that are isolated from political influences, or   9
constrained by rules, is important. Moreover, this short-term fine-tuning should be 
complemented by a long-term policy that aims at promoting competition so that market 
mechanisms can play fully. 
On the contrary, Minsky viewed the government as a necessary complement to 
the profit-oriented sector (and more generally the individual sphere of the economy). 
Given that, according to Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, market mechanisms 
tend to promote inflationary pressures and financial fragility as the economy tends toward 
full employment, a major role of the government is to promote stable full employment, 
that is, non-inflationary and financially sound full employment. This requires that the 
government intervenes continuously over the business cycle, rather than sporadically 
during downturns and upturns. Given the institutional context, specific financial 
developments always tend to generate stagflation and/or recession, and the point of 
policy is to prevent, or at least to constrain, their developments independently of short-
term profitability and short-term welfare gains.
1 
In order for the government to be able to intervene continuously over the cycle, it 
should put in place structural macroeconomic
2 programs that directly manage the labor 
force, pricing mechanisms, investment projects, and constantly monitor financial 
developments. Because those programs would be permanent and structural, rather than 
discretionary and specific to one administration, they would be highly isolated from the 
political cycle and political deliberations. In addition, they would manage the goal 
directly, rather than indirectly through interest-rate manipulations, tax incentives or 
indirect spending.
3 All this eliminates problems of lags, credibility, and time 
inconsistency. However, this does not mean that the government should apply a rule 
blindly when implementing its policy; discretion is still possible within each program to 
make sure that it works best. For example, Social Security is a structural program but 
                                                 
1  Recently, innovative mortgage contracts and securities have been praised for allowing low-
income households to become homeowners. However, given their structure, those financial innovations 
also led to the emergence of Ponzi home financing and frauds, and the welfare gains predictably were 
short-lived. Some of those financial innovations should probably not have been allowed to exist and low-
income homeownership may not be sustainable without government programs.  
2  Micromanagement would be left to individual initiatives. The goal of the government is to 
control the overall direction of the system, not all prices and production processes (Minsky 1986: 293, 308). 
3 Discretion could still be used to smooth the business cycle if needed, but the structural programs 
would already do most of the job. Tax incentives and subsidies should be used for long-term purposes in 
order to stir the economy in the direction that the government would prefer.   10
government employees still have large discretion to determine if someone qualifies for 
benefits. As shown below, the same applies to the programs put forward by Minsky, in 
which human discretion is still possible within the set of rules and structures.  
In the end therefore, for Minsky, individual economic freedom and big 
government are not incompatible. On the contrary, a big government is necessary to have 
an economy “where freedom to innovate and to finance is the rule” (Minsky 1993: 81). 
Entrepreneurs’ creativity and imagination can thrive more fully and be more focused 
because of the higher stability of the system. 
 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN MINSKY: STABILIZATION POLICY 
 
From Small to Big Government 
Without a doubt, a bigger government has helped to stabilize the growth process in the 
United States. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, the period between 1900 and 2007 can 
be divided into two parts with a dividing line set in 1946. The first period recorded more 
frequent, longer and deeper recessions. Upswings were also much more fast and short, 
making the overall business cycle erratic and unstable. The post-1946 era recorded 
smoother growth and grew at about the same rate as the first period, with a rate of growth 
of real GNP of 3.356% (against 3.364% for the first period).  
   11
































































































































Real GNP (Left axis)
Annualized growth rate of real GNP (Right axis)  
Sources: NBER, BEA, Gordon (1990). Calculation by the author. 
 
 









in real GNP 
1900-1946 12  3.9  years  18.1  months -6.7% 
1947-2007 10  6.1  years  10.4  months -1.5% 
Sources: NBER, BEA, Gordon (1990).  
Note: The average decline in real GNP includes all quarters with a negative growth rate, 
even if there is no contraction at that time. 
 
 
This much more stable economy is due to the much bigger size of the government. 
Figure 2 shows that the government has more than tripled in size from about 9% of GDP 
in 1929 to more than 30% of GDP in 2007. Figure 3 shows that most of the contribution 
to this growth has come from the federal government, which has grown from about 2% of 
GDP in 1929 to about 20% of GDP in 2007. The state and local governments have also 
contributed to the growth but in a more moderate way as shown in Figure 4. After the 
mid 1950s, this growth of the government sector has taken the form of increased Social   12
Security payments, welfare payments, interest payments and subsidies, while government 
consumption and investment have declined steadily especially for the federal government.  
 




















































































































































































































Government total net expenditures Government gross purchases
Gross private domestic investment  
Source: BEA 
Note: Government gross purchases refer to the gross investment and consumption of the 
government. Government total net expenditures include government gross purchases net 
of consumption of fixed capital, plus all net payments to the private sector and the rest of 
the world.
4  
                                                 
4 To have a more accurate view of the capacity of government to inject funds in the domestic 
economy, one may want to exclude net payments to the rest of the world. In 2007, government total net 
expenditures represented 33.5% of GDP out of which 1.4 percentage points constituted net payments to the 
rest of the world.    13



















































































































































































































Federal total net expenditures Federal gross purchases






















































































































































































































State and local gov. total net expenditures State and local gov. gross purchases
 
Source: BEA 
   14
 
This increased capacity of the government to stabilize the system is easy to 
understand if one refers to the Kalecki equation. Knowing that gross private domestic 
investment is the most erratic component of the equation, in order for the government to 
be able to stabilize aggregate monetary profit, its expenditures and taxes should be at 
least as big as investment. Of particular relevance is the federal government because of 
its monetary sovereignty and of the flexibility of its budgeting process. Figures 2 and 3 
show that in the 1920s and 1930s the federal government was too small to be able to 
compensate for swings in investment. Leaving aside World War II, an adequate size was 
not reached until the early 1950s after which the federal government total expenditures 
always have been above 15% of GDP which is approximately the size of investment in 
the U.S. economy (post-1946 gross private domestic investment averaged 16% of GDP). 
Thus, for the U.S. economy, accounting for other fluctuations besides investment, a big 
government means a federal government that represents about 20% of GDP. Judged with 
this criterion, the size of the federal government was too big in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
However, since the early 1980s some disturbing trends have appeared. As shown 
in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, not only has the size of federal government purchases been 
constantly declining, but there also has been a shift in responsibilities away from the 
federal government and toward state and local governments. This shift in the composition 
of government intervention is worrisome because state and local governments are not 
able to deal with macroeconomic issues, and because of the regressive nature of their tax 
structures. As shown below, one may also critique the composition of government 
spending. Minsky critiqued the ballooning role of transfer payments and the decline in 
regulation, which have respectively promoted inflationary tendencies and financial 
instability.   15













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Federal gross purchases State and gross purchases  
Source: BEA   16
 
If a big government is able to stabilize the system, a desirable property that a 
small government does not have, it also creates new problems. Indeed, by becoming too 
big it may generate inflationary tendencies, promote moral hazard, and dampen 
entrepreneurship. In terms of inflationary potential, Figure 7 shows that, after 1946, there 
is a clear inflationary bias. 
 





















































































































One may see the potential inflationary effect of big government by expressing in terms of 
relative growth the national income identity PQ ≡ W + Π and the Kalecki equation of 
profit (Tymoigne 2008): 
gP ≈ (gw – gAPL)sW + (gZ – gQ)sZ + (gCΠsCΠ – gSHsSH + gIsI + gGsG – gTsT + gXsX – gJsJ) – 
gQsΠnD + (gTΠ – gQ)sTΠ 
With si the share of variable i in GDP and gi the growth rate of variable i and, APL the 
average productivity of labor, w the average wage rate (including compensation and 
benefits), ΠnD the retained earnings of firms, SH the saving level of households, and CΠ 
the consumption out of profit, I the level of gross investment, X exports, J imports, Z the 
non-wage incomes paid by firms (dividends, interests, rental income), and TΠ corporate   17
income tax. This identity can be used to develop a theory of inflation by using, for 
example, the conflict-claim theory to explain gw, the liquidity preference theory to 
explain gZ, and the theory of effective demand to explain gQ. gAPL can be assumed to 
behave differently depending on the structure of the labor market (very flexible in a 
sluggish labor market, close to constant in a free-market labor market). For the sake of 
argument, shares are given but could also be explained by using a monetary theory of 
distribution.  
Thus, a big government, for which sG, sT and/or sTΠ are big, can contribute to 
inflation by raising the wage of its employees too fast, by increasing spending too fast on 
goods and services, and by having a tax structure that contributes to a fast increase in 
corporate income taxes. Transfer payments may create additional inflationary pressures 
by growing disposable wage income and disposable net profit too fast. In addition, a big 
government in which political discretion in economic issues is high may prevent gG and 
gT to move up or down when they need to in order to prevent inflation or recession. 
Finally, if the government mainly focuses its spending defense and other unproductive 
expenditures, there is a greater chance that a big government will be inflationary (Han 
and Mulligan 2008). 
In terms of potential moral hazard, by providing a safety net the government may 
achieve short-term stability at the expense of long-term instability. A first moral hazard is 
the tendency for businesses to take too many risks knowing that the government will 
rescue most of them in case of crisis. A second moral hazard is the potential decrease in 
labor force participation, especially if there are substantial income losses from going back 
into the work force and giving up transfer payments, which may affect production 
capacities of the country and so may compound the potential inflationary pressures over 
the long term.  
In terms of entrepreneurship, a too tight control of the economy may remove the 
fun from entrepreneurship by limiting choices and constraining possibilities. As Keynes 
noted, investment activity is highly uncertain and risky, but uncertainty is also a factor 
that promotes investment by leaving some space for human creativity and imagination. 
Minsky was aware of this and noted that:   18
Federal Reserve policy therefore needs to continuously “lean against” the use of 
speculative and Ponzi finance. But Ponzi finance is a usual way of debt-financing 
investment in process in a capitalist society. Consequently, capitalism without 
financial practices that lead to instability may be less innovative and expansionary; 
lessening the possibility of disaster might very well take part of the spark of 
creativity out of the capitalist system. (Minsky 1986: 328) 
Overall, therefore, the government has to make sure to provide sound financing methods 
while also promoting a dynamic economy that can respond to the needs of society.  
In order to contain those problems, specific policies should be created that limit 
political interests in their implementation and that promote price stability as well as check 
for potential moral hazards. Where politicians would have a way to influence long-term 
trends in government activity is by influencing the existing structural programs and 
creating new ones. Minsky had a view of a big government that tries to respect those 
conditions. 
 
Minsky’s Idea of a Big Government: The Economics of Control 
In a controlled economy, to employ Abba Lerner’s term, the government acts as a planner 
in order to prevent key elements of the economy from going out of hand by applying 
neither fascism nor socialism, but by following a “third course” which involves removing 
“certain substantial spheres of activity from the hands of private enterprise” (Robinson 
1943 [1966]: 86).  
The policy problem is to devise institutional structures and measures that 
attenuate the thrust of inflation, unemployment, and slower improvements in the 
standard of life without increasing the likelihood of a deep depression. […] The 
current strategy seeks to achieve full employment by way of subsidizing demand. 
The instruments are financing conditions, fiscal inducements to invest, 
government contracts, transfer payments, and taxes. This policy strategy now 
leads to chronic inflation and periodic investment booms that culminate in 
financial crises and serious instability. The policy problem is to develop a strategy 
for full employment that does not lead to instability, inflation, and unemployment. 
(Minsky 1986: 295, 308)   19
Minsky was aware that, given the dynamic nature of capitalism, there is no definitive 
solution to the control of the economy, and that the government must respond 
continuously to and, even better, anticipate changes in the institutional structure. New 
regulations lead to regulatory arbitrages, and the creativity of economic agents generates 
new economic structures and so a need to change regulations.  
A first element that should not be determined by market mechanisms is the level 
of employment. Minsky promoted the creation of an “employer of last resort” (ELR), i.e. 
broad government employment programs similar to those of the 1930s. The programs 
would be permanent, decentralized and would employ at a uniform wage anybody willing 
and able to work but unable to find a job in the private sector, and would take individuals 
as they are, where they are. Recently, this program has attracted growing attention and it 
has been applied in a limited way in Argentina (Tcherneva and Wray 2007; Wray 2007; 
Kaboub 2008). There are several benefits to this program. First, by fixing the base wage 
at which one is employed, the program would help to keep in check the growth of the 
average wage rate, which can be a source of inflation. In addition, this program tends to 
eliminate the inflationary tendency of the existing welfare and unemployment insurance 
programs that provide an income even though no current economic contribution to 
society is made.
5 By contrast, ELR workers would contribute to the growth of the 
economy (gQ). Second, by acting as an income buffer for those who lost their job in the 
private sector, the program would act as an automatic stabilizer. This is a good way to 
eliminate lags and to limit political interests in fiscal activism because G and T would 
move automatically with the number of people employed in the ELR programs. Third, 
this program would also contribute to a more harmonious society by decreasing income 
inequalities (the ELR wage would be a living wage), and by lowering crimes and other 
negative consequences (most of them non-monetary) induced by unemployment.  
A second element of the economy that should be controlled is the level and 
composition of investment. The government should socialize investment by fixing the 
reward received by entrepreneurs, and by allocating resources toward the most socially 
                                                 
5 This does not mean that welfare and Social Security should be eliminated. Future contributors 
(children) and past contributors (retirees) to the economic welfare of developed societies deserve to be 
helped. However, an opportunity to work should be offered to those who are able and willing to contribute 
presently to the economic welfare of the society.   20
needed investment projects. This does not mean that all individual decisions would be 
removed because the government could just bring forward the areas that need investment 
and let the private companies propose solutions. The government (or special committees 
including government representatives) would select the most appropriate projects without 
necessarily undertaking their construction nor removing ownership from the private 
sector (Keynes 1936: 378ff.). The government could also leave frivolous investment 
projects (cell phones, etc.) to the private sector while housing, infrastructures and other 
social needs would be supervised by government.
6 Minsky’s proposal for community 
development banks is part of this project. The goals of this policy are threefold. First, 
investment projects would be allocated to sectors that need them; this would help to 
homogenize society and so would contribute to its stability and well-being. Second, it 
would help to promote financial stability because the positive macroeconomic feedback 
loop between investment and profit would be mostly eliminated. Finally, given that the 
growth of investment may contribute to inflation, the socialization of investment would 
help to manage inflation.  
A third element is the control of the growth of income through a generalized 
income policy. The ELR program and the socialization of investment already would help 
to control income growth by affecting the growth of wages and aggregate profit. 
Nevertheless, additional policies may be necessary that define general rules with respect 
to wage bargaining, as well as the payout ratios of firms. For example, Minsky proposed 
that the pay-out ratio of banks be controlled by a regulator so that the retained earnings of 
banks do not grow too fast because this is a major cause of instability and inflation 
(Minsky 1975b; Minsky 1977; Minsky 1986: 234-238, 321). This policy has two 
essential benefits; the first one is to help to dampen inflationary pressures. As shown 
earlier, wage payments, interest payments, retained earnings and other income payments 
may have an effect on inflation if they grow too fast. The second benefit is to promote 
                                                 
6  The recent bridge collapse in Minneapolis was a dreadful reminder that many major U.S. 
infrastructures are falling apart, mostly because their maintenance and expansion was not performed 
properly because of the lack of funding by state governments and private enterprises. The American 
Societies of Civil Engineers (2005) gave a D average to American infrastructures and recommended a 
major overhaul and expansion. A government employment program like the Public Works Administration 
(which was responsible for the construction of many of the existing major infrastructures) would be very 
helpful.    21
financial stability by limiting the demand that stockholders can put on rates of returns that 
firms and banks should generate.  
A fourth element that should be controlled is the growth and distribution of assets 
of all financial institutions. The main way this should be done is by a cash-flow oriented 
regulation and supervision while also using a flexible capital requirement policy. One 
may note, however, that focusing mainly on equity is not a good strategy because it does 
not provide a direct measure of the capacity of a financial institution to withstand 
liquidity shocks. Actually, it is not even a good measure of solvency because of the 
multiple adjustments to capital equity that do not necessarily reflect the capacity to have a 
profitable business. Current cash flows, future expected cash flows, and current amount 
of liquid assets provide a much better view of what the potential needs and costs of 
refinancing or liquidation are.  
  One may note that all these programs are coherently related and are meant to be 
permanent. They are not a patchwork of temporary discretionary policies. These 
programs are also largely independent of the political climate, and influence both 
production capacities and purchasing power. Their implementation would be done by 
government employees who would have some discretion within the rules set up by the 
programs.
7 For example, an ELR worker may be fired if he or she does not perform, and, 
within the income policy, some sectors may be favored over others to encourage their 
development. Note also that the inflationary tendencies of a big government are 
constrained by controlling both public and private spending directly and indirectly. There 
is no doubt that all these programs will lead to changes in the behavior of individuals and 
that unpredicted and unintended adverse consequences will appear, but those have to be 
dealt with as we go in function of the changes in the structure of the economy. Again, 
there is no final solution to economic management in a society that is highly dynamic and 
that fosters individual decisions. 
 
                                                 
7 These programs would be well funded and the government would try to attract the best and 
brightest individuals to manage them by paying a competitive wage. Too often, government programs are 
purposely underfunded in order to limit their effectiveness and push for their abandonment.    22
PAST BIG GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
For most economists, “Keynesianism” is synonymous to any type of “fiscal activism.” 
Keynes’s approach is usually summed up in a 45-degree-line diagram that seems to 
guarantee that any type of government expenditures and tax measures brings full 
employment, now and forever, without any problems. However, Minsky noted that this is 
a gross simplification and he was highly critical of what happened in the 1960s: 
Just as there never really was a Keynesian revolution in economic theory, there 
also never really was one in policy. […] All that was assimilated from Keynes by 
the policy establishment and its clients was the analysis of an economy in deep 
depression and a policy tool of deficit financing. […] Keynesian economics, even 
in the mind of the economics profession, but particularly in the view of politicians 
and the public, became a series of simple-minded guidelines to monetary and 
fiscal policy. […] The institutional structure has not been adapted to reflect the 
knowledge that the collapse of aggregate demand and profits, such as occasionally 
occurred and often threatened to occur in pre-1933 small government capitalism, 
is never a clear and present danger in Big Government capitalism such as has 
ruled since World War II. (Minsky 1986: 291, 295) 
In the last chapter of the General Theory, Keynes noted that the “outstanding faults of the 
economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its 
arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes” (Keynes 1936: 372) which 
“may be considered dual aspects of a single basic trouble; for economists have long 
recognized a connection between unemployment and the maldistribution of purchasing 
power” (Keynes in Chew 1936). As a consequence, Keynes was for a direct participation 
of the government through specific fiscal and monetary measures, that included some 
form of planning via a cooperation between the private and public sector (socialization of 
investment), the maintenance of a low interest rate that rewards only risks and skills 
(euthanasia of rentiers), and a progressive tax policy that favors consumption. Let us look 
at past experiences and see how they conform to Keynes’s view of government 
intervention. 
   23
The Roosevelt Era 
When campaigning in 1932, Roosevelt ran on the popular idea that the federal 
government should balance its budget. He blamed Hoover for his fiscal “extravagance 
and […] rashly pledged to reduce government expenditure by 25 per cent” (Badger 1989: 
111). However, given that society was on the brink of collapse, once elected, Roosevelt 
decided to increase government intervention and to deficit spend. These dramatic changes 
were not based on the General Theory, which was not available, or on the advice of 
Keynes who had not provided any.
8  
From the end of 1933, Keynes had applauded most of the New Deal policies and 
he continued to do so over time: 
I accept the view that durable investment must come increasingly under state 
direction. I sympathise with Mr. Wallace’s agricultural policies. I believe that the 
SEC is doing splendid work. I regard the growth of collective bargaining as 
essential. I approve minimum wage and hours regulations. I was altogether on 
your side the other day, when you deprecated a policy of general wage reductions 
as useless in present circumstances. (Keynes 1938b [1982]: 438-439) 
However, he was also very critical of the lack of engagement of the Roosevelt 
Administration in recovery efforts. Keynes wanted it to go much further and at a much 
faster pace by deficit spending massively through large-scale government expenditures in 
housing,
9 unemployment relief programs, aid to farmers, public utilities, railroads, and 
other public works (Keynes 1933d, 1934a, 1934b, 1938b). In addition to fiscal measures, 
he also pushed for a policy of cheap money that influences directly the whole yield curve: 
I put in the second place the maintenance of cheap and abundant credit, in 
particular the reduction of the long-term rate of interest. […] I see no reason why 
you should not reduce the rate of interest on your long-term government bonds to 
2 ½ per cent or less, […] if only the Federal Reserve System would replace its 
                                                 
8 As Lee (1989) notes, the idea that government deficit can be good had been advanced long 
before Keynes. 
9 “The best aid to recovery because of the large and continuing scale of potential demand, […] the 
wide geographical distribution of this demand, and because the sources of its finance are largely 
independent of the stock exchange.” (Keynes 1938b [1982]: 436)   24
present holdings of short-dated Treasury issues by purchasing long-dated issues in 
exchange. (Keynes 1933d [1982]: 297) 
Further, in 1936 he was able to present the core policy agenda of the General Theory to 
the Roosevelt Administration: 
The main defects in our present society are its failure to provide full employment, 
and its inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes. […] In the conditions that 
now exist the “abstinence” of the rich impedes the growth of wealth, and action to 
remove great inequalities increases it. […] It appears that effective saving 
depends on the scale of investment, which varies inversely with the rate of interest. 
Thus, it is socially advantageous to reduce the rate of interest […] [so that it] 
would be possible to increase the stock of capital to a point at which the use of 
capital goods would cost little more than enough to cover wastage and 
obsolescence. This state of affairs, though it would leave scope for individual 
enterprise, would tend to eliminate the rentier, and to weaken the power of the 
capitalist to exploit the scarcity value of capital […] and the functionless investor 
would have no place in the economy. (Keynes in Chew 1936) 
Thus, the recommendation of chapter 24, mostly considered as obscure radical sidetracks 
unimportant for the whole book, were pushed forward by Keynes.  
Overall, Keynes critiqued the Roosevelt Administration as “unprepared” (Keynes 
1938a [1982]: 432) and “very slow to get moving” (Keynes 1934a [1982]: 308). He 
stated that the handling of some problems had been “really wicked” (Keynes 1938b 
[1982]: 436) and that “the attainment of the best results has been interfered with by 
certain fallacies of thought” (Keynes 1934d [1982]: 299). One of these fallacies
10 was the 
idea of “sound finance” that pushed Roosevelt to limit the funding of New Deal programs 
and, especially during election years, to try to generate a budget surplus (Lee 1989): 
                                                 
10 Another one, promoted by Irving Fisher, was the idea that reflation was the best way to bring a 
recovery. Like Fisher, Keynes was for going off the gold standard and adopting a managed currency that 
gives the “liberty to make your exchange policy subservient to the needs of your domestic policy” (Keynes 
1933c [1982]: 296; Keynes 1934e). However, contrary to quantity theoreticians, he thought that this was 
only a subsidiary policy. Output and employment should be stimulated directly through fiscal measures that 
affect spending and income, rather than indirectly by means of inflationary monetary measures (Keynes 
1933d; Skidelsky 1994: 493).   25
Most New Dealers believed that recovery would come from the revival of private 
investment. […] Similarly business advocates of spending in 1933 saw public 
spending as a ‘quick fix’ designed to ‘start up’ the economy, not a permanent 
crutch. Most supporters of government spending did not want to unbalance the 
budget. […] Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., argued 
that in order to revive the private investment necessary for full recovery, the 
federal budget must be balanced so that business would have the confidence to 
invest. (Badger 1989: 110-112) 
As a consequence, as shown in Figure 8, the federal current budget deficit never 
accounted for more than 4% of GDP in the 1930s. This is minuscule if one considers the 
size of the problem and that the last minor recession of 2001 led to a deficit of about 
3.5% of GDP. In addition, after 1936, the Roosevelt Administration aimed at reaching 
surpluses as fast as possible that led to a short but severe recession in 1937.  
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Source: BEA 
Note: Over the period, the total budget of state and local governments was balanced. 
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Given the constraint of sound finance, as shown in Figure 3, federal government 
spending grew very slowly. In fact, most of the growth came under the Hoover 
Administration, and, from 1933 to 1941, federal government spending mostly stagnated. 
In addition, in order to reach a surplus, Roosevelt suggested cutting New Deal programs: 
He was embarrassed by Republican criticism of the budget deficits under the New 
Deal. He justified them by arguing that it was only extraordinary spending for 
humanitarian reasons that unbalanced the budget […]. He looked for ways to 
show that deficits were being scaled down so that he could promise a balanced 
budget for fiscal 1938. […] In 1936, an election year, he was even prepared to cut 
spending on the Civilian Conservation Corps […]. (Badger 1989: 111) 
Rather than a sound economic program, Roosevelt and Congress saw the work programs 
as an emergency measure needed, if not for moral obligation, at least to avoid the 
destruction of capitalism altogether.
11  
By 1938, because of successful experimentations and through the influence of 
Hansen, Currie and Eccles
12, the idea that government deficit could be good to restore 
prosperity had gained some ground in the Administration and the business community 
but, at least for the latter, “only if it could be stripped of New Deal reformism” (Badger 
1989: 116). However, Roosevelt remained skeptical of fiscal-led stimulus. As a 
proportion of GDP, government spending and the federal deficit were lower than in 1936 
and the Administration went back to a surplus in 1941. This surplus allowed Roosevelt to 
keep a good public appearance, but it did not generate a recession because, due to 
national defense expenditures, the total fiscal position of the government was now a 
deficit representing 4.9% of GDP.  
One has to wait until the entry of the U.S. into World War II to see a major 
government involvement in the economy and a commitment to let the budget deficits 
grow as much as needed. Between 1942 and 1945, the current deficit averaged 9.4% of 
                                                 
11  This is illustrated by the name that the Administration gave to its first government work 
program. The Emergency Conservation Work Act of March 1933 created the Emergency Conservation 
Work Program (officially renamed the Civilian Conservation Corps in June 1937). 
12 However, this “Currie Keynesianism” (Barber 1996) was of the fine-tuner type that “shall exert 
such powers as it has toward promoting business stability and moderating fluctuations in production, 
employment and prices” (Eccles in Barber 1996: 94; Eccles 1937) and shall “fluctuate the total expenditure 
[…] [and] income tax rates […] as a means to regularize the flow of total expenditures and to promote 
economic stability” (Hansen in Barber 1996: 160).    27
GDP and the total deficit averaged 22.1% of GDP, which had the unintended (and 
probably unexpected) consequence of strongly putting the U.S. economy back on its feet. 




























































































































































































































However, Keynes lamented that this was not at all what he had in mind when he 
promoted government intervention and complained that:  
Alas, your letter confirms the prevailing opinion that money is only available for 
what is useless. (Keynes in Skidelsky 2000: 51) 
Similarly, the monetary measures (management of the whole yield curve below 2 ½ 
percent) proposed by Keynes were only implemented because of the war and were 
abandoned in 1953.  
By the middle of World War II, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), 
recognizing that the private sector cannot sustain full employment, took a giant step 
toward Keynes’s position. It recognized that deficits far greater than in the 1930s would   28
be necessary to maintain full employment, and that some private economic activities 
would have to be partly implemented by the government in order to make sure to 
“provide work for adults who are willing and able to work, if private industry is unable to 
do so” (NRPB in Barber 1996: 159). This was too radical for Congress who stopped 
funding the NRPB in 1943. Another shot at government planning was attempted by the 
Full Employment Bill of 1945 which proposed to put in place a structural “last resort […] 
program of federal spending and investment” (Bailey 1950: 13-14) in order to make sure 
that “all Americans able to work and seeking work have the right to useful, remunerative, 
regular, and full-time employment” (Section 2b of the Full Employment Bill of 1945 in 
Bailey [1950: 243]). However, the bill did not pass the House and it was replaced by the 
Employment Act of 1946. Often, the Act is thought to represent the final victory of 
Keynes’s ideas and the establishment of a long period of Keynesianism that culminated 
in Nixon’s famous tirade “we are all Keynesians now.” However, the Act was 
substantially different from the 1945 bill (Santoni 1986) and Barber notes that: 
The legislative achievement represented by the Employment Act of 1946 has 
sometimes been treated as a triumph for a Keynesian point of view. It needs to be 
underscored that such a reading of that event is mistaken. […] Even […] the 
Council of Economic Advisers, owed less to their thinking than to the views 
presented by an economist hostile to Americanized Keynesianism. (Barber 1996: 
169) 
Rather than guaranteeing the right to employment, the 1946 Act transformed the U.S. 
government into a full-fledged fine-tuner in order to make employment consistent with 
business interests. This paved the way for incoherent, discretionary programs, time 
inconsistency problems, and credibility problems that ultimately led to the incapacity to 
manage both price stability and employment.  
If one must associate an economist to the policies of the 1930s, Irving Fisher is a 
much more appropriate candidate. At the end of 1932, he sent his Booms and 
Depressions to Raymond Moley (an original member of the Brain Trust who played a 
key role in shaping the first New Deal) and asked to meet with him (Barber 1996: 22). In 
1933 and 1934, “Fisher wrote to Roosevelt at least thirty-five times (receiving four 
replies) and visited him twice” (Allen 1993: 704) which is far more than Keynes. In   29
addition, he had key allies in the Administration whom he personally recommended to 
the President (like George F. Warren), or who were sympathetic to the reflation approach 
(like the Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr.) (Barber 1996: 15).  
In order to solve what he saw as a monetary problem, and based on the quantity 
theory of money and the money multiplier, Fisher advocated a plan that emphasized 
reflating and then stabilizing prices by controlling the money supply and the velocity of 
money in order to manage aggregate spending
13 (Fisher 1932: 121ff., 212ff.; Fisher 
1935a). The control of the money supply would go through credit control (via large 
variations in nominal policy rates to affect real interest rates, enlarged open-market 
operations beyond real bills, manipulations of reserve requirements, and other means) 
and gold control (by forbidding gold coinage and by varying the bid and ask prices of 
gold at the Treasury desk). He also advocated temporary fiscal deficits during recessions 
(Fisher 1932: 104-105; Pavanelli 2004: 298) but was not very fond of public work 
programs and unemployment insurance. According to Fisher, the latter two were only 
“palliative” policies because unemployment was only a consequence of the depression 
and because work programs were slow to implement
- and only effective on a very large 
scale, which goes against the private profit system. Beyond Booms and Depressions, 
additional influence can be seen through the correspondence between Fisher and the 
Roosevelt Administration, sometimes at its request, in which he advised a bank holiday 
(2 days before Roosevelt declared it), going off the gold standard or at least devaluating 
the dollar by 50%, the continuation of employment programs and government spending 
as long as they have a monetary component like subsidies and loans to private businesses 
(Barber 1996: 84-85; Allen 1977).  
The Roosevelt Administration followed Fisher on most of these points, by 
running temporary deficits, by buying large amounts of gold in 1933 and 1934, by going 
off the gold standard and by raising the trading price of gold at the Treasury desk in 
January 1934 (with the effect of devaluating the dollar relative to currencies still in the 
gold standard system), and by putting in place temporary working programs (Pavanelli 
                                                 
13 In order to increase the velocity of money, Fisher proposed a “stamped dollar” plan (Fisher 
1932: 226ff.) in which special dollar bills would be issued that would stay lawful only if their holders 
periodically apposed a postage stamp on the back of each bill. This would make hoarding costly and so 
would complement monetary growth in order to stimulate spending and so to reflate the economy.   30
2004). Over time, however, his influence diminished. Against Fisher’s advice, Roosevelt 
did not raise the value of gold above $35 (Barber 1996: 81) and, later, Roosevelt did not 
go for his 100% money plan. In addition, Fisher vigorously opposed the New Deal 
measures to restrict supply and to institute economic planning.
14 In particular, “he 
considered the initiatives to regulate wages and production as totally misguided” 
(Pavanelli 2004: 298). In the end, only one of his secondary advices survived the trial 
period and this was the running of temporary fiscal deficits and temporary employment 
programs.  
Thus, one does not have to look to Keynes for a justification of fiscal activism. 
However, Fisher’s strategy is very different from Keynes’s because for Fisher “the 
depression does not indicate a general breakdown of capitalism […]. It indicates almost 
solely a breakdown of our monetary system” (Fisher 1935b in Pavanelli 2004), whereas 
for Keynes the management of some aspects of economic life by the government is 
necessary to avoid “the destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety, and [to 
guarantee] the successful functioning of individual initiative” (Keynes 1936: 380). 
In the end, therefore, the Roosevelt Administration followed many different 
advices. As Roosevelt stated, it was time for “bold and persistent experimentation” 
(Barber 1996: 19) and as Keynes noted: 
It must have been difficult for the President to know in what direction to turn for 
the best available advice. In practice he has shown himself extraordinarily 
accessible to anyone with new ideas to air whom he believed to be independent 
and disinterested. Naturally he had received a great deal of advice, some of it 
inconsistent with the rest and not all of it of equal quality. […] [H]e has been 
happy to provide the political skill and the power of authority to give some sort of 
a run to all kinds of ideas, ready to judge by results […] (Keynes 1934a [1982]: 
306-307) 
This experimental approach can be seen within the structure of the Roosevelt 
Administration with the division between the Structuralists and the Monetarists. However, 
both favored sound finance and relied on price policies to bring a recovery (either 
                                                 
14 Keynes too did not approve of price fixing and output limitations in most industries because this 
was too complex and arbitrary (Keynes 1934c [1982]: 323).   31
through reflation or direct price manipulations) (Barber 1996: 80). Without the War, 
Roosevelt would have continued to muddle through, as any administration has since, 
because there was no conversion to the Keynesian principles of submitting fiscal and 
monetary policies to the achievement of stable full employment. Overall, the fiscal and 
monetary strategies of the Roosevelt Administration were much closer to what Fisher had 
in mind.  
 
The Kennedy-Johnson Era 
The Kennedy-Johnson era is thought to be the apex of “Keynesianism.” Like the 
Roosevelt Administration, the Kennedy-Johnson administration focused on stimulating 
investment and economic growth but it put more emphasis on tax incentives. In order to 
cope with poverty, Johnson, following Kennedy’s initial preparations, also put in place 
his famous War on Poverty. The idea that public employment programs could help in the 
fight was advanced but Johnson was convinced by the Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) that pro-growth and pro-market policies would more effective (Russel 2004). The 
idea that these policies allow everyone to benefit, reduce inequalities, and are a very 
effective means to reduce poverty has been a core assumption of the liberal program on 
poverty (Brady 2003).  
All this again is far more consistent with Irving Fisher’s idea of government 
intervention, and several authors have already criticized the Keynesian nature of this era 
(Kregel 1994; Wray 1994; Harvey 1999, 2000; Bell and Wray 2004; Russel 2004). 
Minsky, who by that time had become an accomplished economist, was very critical of 
the policy of the administration. 
In terms of the overall strategy, Minsky noted that the strong emphasis on 
investment and tax incentives is misplaced: 
Certainly there is an unwarranted emphasis on investment as the source of all 
good things: employment, income, growth, price stability. But in truth, inept and 
inappropriate investment and investment financing deters full employment, 
consumption, economic growth, and price stability. (Minsky 1986: 326) 
One can understand why if one follows Minsky’s apparatus. The Kalecki equation of 
profit creates a destabilizing feedback loop in which current investment is implemented   32
on the expectation that investment will be done in the future. This creates long-term 
explosive patterns à la Harrod and Domar by increasing future production capacities 
without increasing future demand. The General Theory mainly focused on short-term 
demand problems, but Keynes was aware of long-term problems and demonstrated the 
need to emphasize consumption
15 and government spending, and the importance of 
managing investment in order to manage the supply side of the system (Keynes 1936: 
105-106; Minsky 1975a). Consequently, an economic plan that aims at long-term full 
employment and price stability cannot be based on continuously promoting private 
investment because of the financial vicissitudes of investment projects, and because of 
their impact on future production capacities. Minsky also noted that the emphasis on 
investment creates inflationary pressures and income inequality (Minsky 1973, 1981, 
1986). 
In terms of tax incentives, this method of stimulating employment is highly 
indirect. Decreasing taxes (or providing subsidies) does not promote employment if 
businesses do not expect that there is a profitable demand.
16 Similarly, not all 
government expenditures are equally effective in promoting employment, not to say full 
employment, and just deficit spending will not do. A shown in Figure 10, the deficits ran 
in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s did not lead to unemployment rates below average. In fact, 
the correlation between the (current or total) fiscal position of the federal government and 
unemployment is about zero. The level of spending and taxing, if properly used, “only” 
helps to stabilize the economy. However, as Keynes said, there may be several slips 
between the cup and lip, and promoting smoother economic activity will not translate 
automatically into a large increase in employment because of labor saving (productivity 
increases) and labor limiting (price increases) behaviors in the private sector. If one 
focuses on full employment, even over long periods of economic growth, the private 
sector was never able to employ everybody willing to work, so stimulating the private 
sector through government spending and incentives will never allow everybody to 
                                                 
15  Keynes was aware that consumption-based growth should be managed carefully because a 
marginal propensity to consume equal to or above one leads to instability (Keynes 1936: 117). Over the 
past 30 years, households in the U.S. (and all over the world) have been encouraged by financial 
institutions to do precisely that, which has resulted in large instability. 
16 Fisher himself was aware of the need to stimulate spending before business incentives (subsidies, 
etc.) can have any positive effects on economic activity (Fisher 1932: 142).   33
participate (Wray and Pigeon 2000; Harvey 2000). The only way to reach true full 
employment and shared prosperity is by orienting some government spending toward 
hiring the unemployed. The quality of government spending matters as much as the 
quantity of government spending (Tcherneva 2008). 
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In terms of War on Poverty, strong economic growth maintained the 
unemployment rate at about 5% but the effects on poverty were limited. Again, the 
“Keynesian” administration chose a very indirect and market oriented way to solve a 
problem that cannot be eradicated by market mechanisms. The point was to train the low-
skilled workers in order to make them competitive on the job market (Harvey 2000). But, 
as Minsky noted, if this strategy helps to homogenize the labor force and makes it more 
responsive to the needs of the business sector, it cannot deal with labor shortage. The 
implication is a redistribution of poverty not a diminution of poverty (Minsky 1965a, 
1965b). Only providing enough jobs allows people to apply the skills they learned. Brady 
(2003) shows that the growth-market-productivity policy that has been applied in the 
second half of the twentieth century has had only limited success at reducing poverty in   34
Western societies, even more so over the long-run, and has not been effective at all in 
removing entrenched pockets of poverty. 
Finally, Kennedy and Johnson were both heavily influenced by the Sound Finance 
approach and were reluctant to put in place structural programs that would decrease 
control over the level of federal spending and taxing:  
Keynesianism has been frequently misrepresented in this country, and this was the 
case in the Kennedy administration. Two general issues are involved in this 
misrepresentation. First, in the United States an incomplete kind of Keynesianism 
was practiced as understood and implemented by the [CEA] under Heller; thus, 
with no full commitment to planning and government deficit spending in place, 
the full impact of Keynesian measures has never been realized here. […] Second, 
Kennedy and his political advisers […] misunderstood and resisted the new 
economic practices. (Russel 2004: 145) 
Kennedy and Johnson resisted government spending, tried to constrain it as much as 
possible, and refused any government employment program proposed by Structuralists at 
the Labor Department, and instead favored the fine-tuning of economic growth by tax 




The debate between Structuralists (who think that market mechanisms are structurally 
flawed because they fail to provide full employment and economic stability) and the 
Fine-Tuners (who think that discretionary temporary measures help to maintain the 
economy on its non-inflationary employment path, and that it is the only relevant thing a 
government can do) is likely to persist. The debate focuses on, not only the goal to 
achieve, but also the fiscal and monetary macroeconomic strategies to reach the goal.  
For Structuralists, in the spirit of Lerner’s functional finance, the size of the 
federal fiscal position should be determined by the needs of the economy given the 
structural programs in place. When dealing with socio-economic issues, politicians 
should not try to reduce deficits or to use surpluses through discretionary choices. What 
they should do is to promote programs that aim at price stability, financial strength and   35
full employment. This should be complemented by low permanent interest rates that 
reward only competence and risk.  
Keynes was a Structuralist but Keynesianism has always been associated with the 
Fine-Tuners and has been reduced to any type of short-term fiscal activism to manage 
demand. This has allowed the economy to stabilize by producing smoother growth and 
shorter recessions. However, fine-tuning does not allow the economy to reach full 
employment, does not reduce unfair inequalities, leaves aside the importance of supply 
management, and tends to create financial instability and upward price instability. In 
addition, the U.S. government has limited its spending mostly to unproductive activities. 
Overall, fine-tuning is more consistent with Fisher’s thought than with Keynes’s, and, 
today, the former is still very influential, especially as a guide for modern monetary 
policy. 
Like Keynes, Minsky was for a responsible big government, that is, a government 
that puts in place coherent structural programs that directly tackle socio-economic 
problems. Minsky was conscious, however, that big-government capitalism, while 
solving important problems, also creates new problems. Thus, rather than having a 
passive government that just reacts to economic problems through spending, taxing and 
manipulations of financial conditions, Minsky wanted a pro-active form of government 
that takes initiatives to direct the economy toward more stable and fair forms of 
capitalism. That would involve both monetary and fiscal measures and would influence 
both the supply side and demand side of the economic system. That is what 
Keynesianism is all about, systematic decentralized planning rather than discretionary 
incoherent fine-tuning. 
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